Capital flight often amounts to a substantial proportion of GDP in developing countries. This paper presents a portfolio choice model that relates capital flight to return differentials, risk aversion, and three types of risk: economic risk, political instability, and policy variability. Estimating the equilibrium capital flight equation for a panel of 45 developing countries over 16 years, all three types of risk have a statistically significant impact on capital flight. Quantitatively, political instability is the most important factor associated with capital flight. We also identify several political factors that reduce capital flight, ostensibly by signaling that market-oriented reforms are imminent.
Why is it that when an American puts money abroad it is called ''foreign investment'' and when an Argentinean does the same it is called ''capital flight''? Why is it that when an American company puts 30 percent of its equity abroad it is called ''strategic diversification'' and when a Bolivian businessman puts only 4 percent abroad it is called ''lack of confidence''?
Stephen Charles Kanitz in The Wall Street Journal, September 21, 1984, p. 45.
Introduction
International investments are an effective method of portfolio diversification. Movements of capital seeking the highest risk-adjusted return should not be of concern to policy-makers in developing countries if risks can be hedged. Unfortunately, many sources of risk are uninsurable e especially in developing countries with immature institutional structures and nascent financial markets. As a result, when the risk profile of a country changes, capital flight may follow.
Empirical studies show that capital flight is a substantial impediment to growth in developing countries (Varman-Schneider, 1991) . For example, following the economic crisis and political instability in Mexico in 1983, capital outflows were 8.7% of GDP and per capita GDP subsequently fell by 5.8%. The following year, capital outflows were 3.1% of GDP and per capita GDP grew by 6.1%. The speed and magnitude of capital flight suggest that the causative factors are not purely economic. The correspondence between political decisions and the economic environment leads us to examine polities as determinants of investment risk.
In this paper we build a formal international asset allocation model and decompose risk into three factors: economic risk, political instability, and policy uncertainty. While the impact of political risk on asset substitution in open economies has received increasing attention in the literature (Dooley and Isard, 1980; Eaton and Turnovsky, 1983; Ize and Ortiz, 1983; Ize, 1985; Agmon, 1985; Alesina and Tabellini, 1989; Diamonte et al., 1996; Erb et al., 1996 ; Andrews and Sobel, 1999; Lensink et al., 2000; Schulze, 2000; Collier et al., 2001 ), there has not been a clear decomposition of the various aspects of risk on capital flight. The equilibrium of the comprehensive model in this paper shows that many types of risk, as well as risk aversion and return differentials affect investment decisions. Further, the theory developed here shows that any empirical test of the political factors driving capital flight must control for the identified economic conditions that impact investment decisions as well as fully specify sources of risk.
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Our paper contributes to the capital flight literature in several ways. First, from a theoretical perspective, we model capital flight as a portfolio choice dependent upon rate of return differentials, economic risk, and several sources of political risk. Our approach is similar to Collier et al. (2001) who show that capital flight arises from high taxation and large foreign debts. Our model departs from theirs by decomposing the factors that affect the risk of investment, rather than looking at level effects. Second, from an empirical perspective, we depart from Lensink et al. (2000) and many other empirical studies by developing a broader set of political risk measures, producing some surprising findings, while maintaining the theoretically specified control variables in each regression equation. Third, from a statistical perspective, we utilize pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis. Previous studies have concentrated on either time-series or cross-sectional analysis. Panel data allow us to better examine the effects of economic and political variables on capital flight as these values change rapidly over time and cross countries.
Estimating the equilibrium capital flight equation for a panel of 45 developing countries over 16 years, we show that all three types of risk impact capital flight. The empirics show that the quantitatively most important factors affecting capital flight are, in order, political instability, economic risk, and policy uncertainty. All factors are statistically significant at better than the 1% level. Surprisingly, we find that nonviolent demonstrations and constitutional changes in government lead to capital flight reversals. These events appear to signal coming economic reforms that will reduce risks and/or raise returns.
In the following section, we illustrate the influence of political and economic factors that impel capital flight by presenting sketches of the events surrounding several extreme episodes in Argentina, Mexico, South Korea, the Philippines, Nigeria, and Cote d'Ivoire. Section 3 presents a formal model of international portfolio choice. Section 4 decomposes investment risk into economic risk, political instability, and policy uncertainty, and develops measures of each of these. Section 5 estimates the equilibrium capital flight equation and shows that all three types of risk are statistically significant determinants of capital flight. Extensive sensitivity analyses further support our findings, and we briefly relate our results to recent research on the politics of capital flight. Section 6 concludes.
Politics and episodes of capital flight
Economic theory does not provide a single definition of capital flight. Despite definitional problems, several measures of capital flight are available. Three commonly used measures have been developed by the World Bank (1985) , Morgan Guaranty Trust (1986), and Cline (1987) .
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Throughout our analysis, we use the broadest estimate of capital flight e the World Bank (or residual) method e to minimize potential biases in narrower measures. The World Bank method compares the sources of finance (the change in external debt and net foreign direct investment), with the uses of finance (a current account deficit and the change in official reserves). Capital flight occurs when sources of finance exceed uses of finance, hence, the residual. The residual includes assets of both the banking and nonbanking sectors.
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If economic, political, and policy risk affect the magnitude and direction of capital flows in developing countries, we would expect changes in these factors to be correlated with capital flight episodes. As a first cut of the data, we characterize the economic, political, and policy conditions that accompany sudden changes in capital flows. For this detailed analysis, we select six countries from our sample that experienced sudden massive capital flight and provide brief narratives of their economicepoliticalepolicy interrelationships.
Argentina
Like many Latin American countries, capital movements in Argentina are associated with political instability. Fig. 1a presents capital flows for Argentina relative to GDP by year. In 1981 General Jorge Rafael Videla became President, but by December was ousted by Field Marshal Roberto Viola. In 1985 a state of siege was declared to halt right-wing violence, and in 1987 President Raul Alfonsin quelled a military revolt. Throughout the 1980s, inflation was unchecked and the economy deteriorated. In May 1989, President Carlos Saul Menem imposed an austerity program that sparked nationwide unrest. Between 1976 and 1991, capital flight in Argentina averaged 3.4% of GDP per year, peaking at 10% of GDP in 1989.
Mexico
Sporadic economic crises, political reforms, and uprisings by Zapatista rebels in Chiapas were among the problems faced by the Mexican government in the 1980s and 1990s. The economic crisis in the mid-1980s challenged the legitimacy of the ruling party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional or PRI). In the midst of the economic crisis of 1985, election fraud led to massive protests by the opposition in which at least three people died and many were injured. Political reforms were initiated by President Carlos Salinas de Gotari in 1988 and accelerated by his successor, President Ernesto Zedillo. Uprisings in Chiapas and Guerrero demanding greater democratization and a more equitable distribution of income began in the early 1990s. These turbulent events are associated with capital flight as shown in Fig. 1b . Capital flight in Mexico averages 3.1% of GDP annually between 1976 and 1991, reaching a maximum of 8.7% of GDP in 1983.
South Korea
The mid-1980s was a period of revolutionary turmoil and dramatic social change in South Korea, initiating a transition to democracy that culminated in 1988. This democratic transition was not free of bloodshed. Three significant events changed the political landscape of South Korea. In 1986, students marched in Seoul to mark the sixth anniversary of Kwangju uprising, 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 Time Argentina Mexico 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 Time 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 Time 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 Time resulting in a fierce response by the government. In the following year, violent protests occurred in the wake of the selection of Roh Tae Woo, an ex-army general, as the leading party presidential candidate. In 1991, thousands of students demonstrated after police beat a student to death during a demonstration. Fig. 1c indicates that during the political unrest of the mid1980s and early 1990s, there was significant capital flight. South Korea's average capital flight is relatively small between 1976 and 1991, averaging 1.9% of GDP per year, but peaking at 6.6% of GDP in 1987 prior to the democratic transition.
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Philippines
The Philippines led a wave of democratization in Asia beginning in the mid-1980s. In 1985, 100,000 people staged an antigovernment demonstration to mark the second anniversary of the death of Senator Ninoy Aquino. This commenced a movement against the authoritarian regime of Ferdinand Marcos. In the following year, faced with mounting protests and pressure from the U.S., Marcos agreed to a national election and was defeated by Ninoy Aquino's widow Corazon Aquino. Following the election, Marcos supporters clashed with supporters of the new government. During the two-year period of political turmoil and uncertainty, Filipinos transferred large quantities of capital abroad as shown in Fig. 1d . Capital flight in the Philippines averages to 2.6% of GDP annually between 1976 and 1991, exceeding 8% of GDP in 1985 prior to the presidential election.
Cote d'Ivoire
In the 1980s and 1990s, harsh economic conditions led to widespread anger and frustration in Cote d'Ivoire. Worker dissatisfaction was stoked as real wages fell and unemployment soared. In 1986, public discontent with the government's austerity program provoked nationwide violent demonstrations. The threat of a coup in 1990 rose when junior officers and army conscripts seized the Abidjan airport to protest low wages. This produced substantial capital flight as shown in Fig. 1f . Annual average capital flight in Cote d'Ivoire was 3% of GDP per year between 1976 and 1991 , and exceeded 16% of GDP in 1985 
Nigeria
Many sub-Sahara African countries are caught in a coup trap (Londregan and Poole, 1990) , and Nigeria is no exception. Political instability, labor strife, and corruption are endemic. Under authoritarian military regimes, organized labor and political movements were harassed, and opposition leaders purged and imprisoned. Significant events include: in 1985, General Ibrahim Babangida came to power through a military coup; in 1987, an attempted coup failed, followed by the execution of coup leaders; and in 1991, another attempted coup against President Babangida failed. Fig. 1e shows that attempted and actual coups were accompanied by capital flight. Capital flight in Nigeria between 1976 and 1991 averages 7.4% of GDP per year, exceeding 31% of GDP in 1987.
A model of investment and capital flight
Consider an economy with a large number of infinitely-lived identical agents living in a developing country. Agents consume from the return on wealth allocated to one-period investments in the domestic country or to a (single) foreign country. For simplicity there is one investment in each country (which could be considered a basket of investments such as a country mutual fund), and we ignore labor income. There is a single homogeneous good produced in both countries, and population is constant, immobile, and normalized to unity.
Let a t denote assets invested in the domestic market at time t that earn rate of return r t . Investments in the domestic market are risky, r w N(m,s 2 ). By assumption, the domestic country has an immature financial market in which a domestic risk-free return is unavailable. Agents also invest a f t in the foreign country, earning a risk-free time-invariant rate of return r f . The risk-free return can be considered to be U.S. T-Bills.
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A representative agent maximizes lifetime utility by solving
where U(c) is strictly increasing, continuous, and concave. This is a fairly standard portfolio choice model (see, e.g. Huang and Litzenberger, 1988) , so we forego the derivations simply stating optimum allocation equation
where VAR(r tþ1 ) is the variance of the return on domestic investment, and qh ÿ ðE½U$ðc tþ1 Þ=E½U#ðc tþ1 ÞÞ measures risk aversion which is assumed constant. There is an analogous problem being solved by individuals in the other country that determines capital flows into the developing country modeled above. Denote the amount of capital flight that comes from Eq. (3) as a fÃ tþ1 , and capital flows from the foreign country to the domestic country as a f > tþ1 . We define net capital flight in the developing country as A
Then, aggregate capital K invested in the domestic country from time t to time t þ 1 is
Eq. (4) shows that in equilibrium the capital stock is formed from domestic investment and net foreign investment, where both depend on the characteristics of the foreign and domestic markets.
Rearranging Eq. (4) and substituting out domestic investment a Ã tþ1 using Eq. (3), produces the equilibrium capital flight equation
Eq. (5) predicts that capital flight is higher when the expected domestic return is low, domestic investment risk is high, and when risk aversion is high.
The determinants of risk
The next step of the analysis is to decompose the variance in the equilibrium capital flight Eq. (5). We focus on three sources of the variation in returns: economic risk, s 2 e , political instability, s 2 p , and policy uncertainty, s 2 t . Assuming that each type of risk is independently distributed, the risk of domestic investment is
Economic risk, s 2 e , is due to variations in the business environment and consumer confidence. A natural measure of economic risk is the variance of the domestic interest rate. Hayek (1944) , Lucas (1972 ), Friedman (1977 ), and De Gregorio (1993 argue that inflation causes uncertainty about prices, so we utilize the variance of inflation as a second measure of economic risk.
Among the two forms of political risk, s 2 p captures socio-political instability and regime change. Socio-political instability affects the economy by increasing the likelihood of destruction or appropriation of physical and/or human capital (Venieris and Gupta, 1986; Zak, 2000) . Regime stability is an important determinant of the ability to realize and retain returns.
A second type of political risk may arise even though the same government remains in power: it may choose a wholly different policy stance that affects returns. Policy uncertainty, s 2 t , captures changes in government policies such as taxes or regulations that impact firm profitability and thus individual investment incentives.
In the subsections below we further discuss both types of political risk and specify how each is measured.
Measurement of political variables
This section discusses measures of three classes of political risk: (i) socio-political instability, (ii) regime change instability, and (iii) policy uncertainty. Appendix A reports data sources, while descriptive statistics and correlations among variables are reported in Appendix B.
Socio-political instability, SPI, is defined as widespread politically motivated violent and nonviolent protests or uprisings. In addition, punitive government action at times exacerbates the virulence of demonstrations. Thus, SPI includes: (i) violent and nonviolent antigovernment demonstrations, and (ii) violent and nonviolent actions to suppress uprisings by governments. The construction and properties of the SPI indices are fully described in Ghate et al. (2003) derived from principal components analysis. Principal components produces two factors for political instability, which are denoted SPIF1 and SPIF2. The first factor includes general strikes, riots, and antigovernment demonstrations that represents collective protests. The second factor includes purges, guerrilla warfare, and assassinations which captures internal crackdowns and violent uprisings. An increase in SPIF1 or SPIF2 indicates greater SPI.
Regime change instability is categorized into three types (Feng, 1997) . Major regular government change, MJCH, is defined as a constitutional transfer of the executive office within the ruling party or the coalition of ruling parties. Major regular government change produces political instability only if such change leads to a distortion in the fundamental market structure. Irregular government change, IRCH, occurs through unconstitutional means and thus disrupts the political system. Finally, minor regular government change, MRCH, indicates regime stability but a lack of substantial party competition. The probability of a regime change is estimated using a logit model based on the economic and political conditions leading to constitutional and unconstitutional change in the executive power from Feng (1997) . 5 An increase in these measures indicates a higher probability of regime change. While MRCH and MJCH are highly correlated they are constructed from, and measure, distinct events.
Policy uncertainty is measured by the variance of a government's ability to implement policies, or political capacity. The particular measure of political capacity that we use is relative political extraction (RPE), developed by Organski and Kugler (1980) . If RPE is greater than 1, then the government is defined as politically capable as it collects more taxes than expected given economic conditions; if RPE is less than 1, then the government fails to collect expected tax revenue and is regarded as politically less capable. 6 We use the variance of RPE to measure policy uncertainty, similar to Feng and Chen (1997) and Feng (1999 Feng ( , 2003 .
The time-series trends of the political variables are described in Appendix B. Taking the first and second differences of the political variables yield similar descriptive statistics for volatility. Comparing the standard deviation of the political variables shows that socio-political instability and regime instability are more volatile than policy uncertainty. We also examine the variation of these variables over time by comparing the proportion of within-country variation to total variation. The ratio of within-country variance to total variance in SPIF1 is 0.616, while the value for SPIF2 is 0.853. The ratios of within-country to total variance for the regime instability variables MJCH, MRCH, and IRCH are, respectively, 0.424, 0.383, and 0.640. The ratio of within-country variance to total variance in RPE is 0.391. These ratios also indicate high volatility of the political variables.
Empirical tests of the capital flight model
The primary testable implication of this paper is that both types of political risk affect the magnitude of capital flight, controlling for return differentials and economic risk. This section estimates the equilibrium capital flight Eq. (5) to test this hypothesis. We use capital flight data for 45 developing countries from Africa, Asia, and Latin America between 1976 and 1991 (small variations in years occur due to limits on data availability). Countries and the time interval were chosen to capture high volatility in capital movements. The ratio of within-country variance to total variance in capital flight is relatively high, being 0.740. Appendix A reports the data sources and years of coverage.
5 The Feng regime change data set ends in 1989. The authors thank Yi Feng for making his data available to us. 6 RPE is constructed in the following way. First, a regression is estimated for the ratio of tax revenue to GDP as a function of time, the ratio between mining to GDP, the ratio of agriculture to GDP, and the ratio of exports to GDP. Second, RPE is defined as the actual tax revenue to GDP ratio over predicted tax revenue to GDP; see Arbetman and Kugler (1997) . The authors thank Jacek Kugler for making this data available to us.
The capital flight Eq. (5) at time t is more easily estimable by dividing both sides by K t ,
Using a linear production function to transform capital into output, Y t ¼ lK t , for l > 0, Eq. (7) can be written in terms relative to output. Taking natural logs of this equation and approximating lnð1 ÿ xÞ by ÿ lnðxÞ; for x ¼ E ÿ r t ÿ r f Á q Y t VARðr t Þ < 1 produces the equation
where d is an agglomeration of parameters from the model. Finally, using the decomposition of the variance of returns (6) yields the estimable equation
Eq. (9) indicates that when estimating capital flight equations, one must control for the return differential, DRT, and GDP. Besides these controls, the model predicts that capital flight will rise with increasing domestic economic risk, s 2 e;t , which is measured by the variance of the domestic interest rate, s 2 DR, or the variance of inflation, s 2 INF. The model also predicts that capital flight increases with political instability, s 2 p;t , which is measured by collective protests, SPIF1, or violent uprisings, SPIF2, as well as the probabilities of major, minor, and irregular government changes, MJCH, MRCH, and IRCH. The final prediction is that capital flight rises with policy uncertainty, s 2 t;t , which is measured by the variance of relative political extraction, s 2 RPE.
Empirical results
Because the countries in our sample have diverse political landscapes and face economic volatility, a fixed-effects model is used so that country-specific characteristics do not drive the results.
9 Political risk variables are lagged one year to account for possible endogeneity.
10 Table 1 reports the estimation of the equilibrium capital flight Eq. (9) 10 Similar results obtain when political variables are lagged two or three years. 11 The significance of all of the economic variables is surprising given some moderately high correlations between them. (2) and (3) add to the base model the measures of socio-political instability, SPIF1 and SPIF2, respectively. While violent uprisings, SPIF2, have the expected sign, increasing capital flight, collective protests, SPIF1, decrease capital flight. Both are statistically significant at the 1% level. These regressions explain over 50% of the variation in capital flight.
The reduction in capital flight in countries experiencing collective protests absent political violence likely obtains because these countries often undertake reforms, including transitions to democracy, that lead to increased stability. For example, Lohmann (1994) establishes that collective protests in East Germany over the period 1989e1991 led to an unprecedented internal change in leadership and eventual unification with West Germany. Let us restate our first surprising result: organized protests reduce capital flight if they are by and large nonviolent. Conversely, as predicted by the theory, violent uprisings, SPIF2, have a direct adverse effect on capital flight.
Eqs. (4)e(6) add regime change risk to the base model of Eq. (1). These results show our next surprising finding: with better than 99% confidence the regressions show that major and minor government changes, MJCH and MRCH, reduce capital flight. This indicates that major and minor government changes raise stability, presumably because they signal that market-oriented reforms are occurring. Feng (1999) argues that the short-term uncertainty generated by major government change is dominated by the long-term benefits of increased stability. As for minor government change, Feng argues that since it does not involve a change of the ruling party or coalition of parties, it is an indicator of political stability and continuity.
12 Conversely, Eq. (6) reveals that irregular government change, IRCH, is positively related to capital flight, but is statistically insignificant.
Eq. (7) adds policy uncertainty to the base model of Eq. (1). The estimated coefficient of s 2 RPE is statistically significant at the 1% level and quantitatively important. Thus, policy uncertainty induces capital flight as investors diversify away from high-risk environments.
Eq. (8) is the full model of capital flight that includes economic risk, political instability, and policy uncertainty. The specification includes variables from each narrow category (sociopolitical instability, regime change instability, and policy uncertainty) that positively impact capital flight. The estimated coefficients show that economic factors, violent uprisings, and irregular government change are all statistically significant contributors to capital flight at better than the 1% level. These factors reveal the interleaving of economic and political factors that drive capital flight.
Eqs. (9) and (10) explore whether the ''surprising'' capital flight reversal results continue to hold in the full model. In these regressions, we include collective protests and major or minor government change, as well as the variance of RPE. The MJCH and MRCH variables continue to be negative and significant at the 1% level. Thus, we find that some political factors induce capital flight while others reduce capital outflows.
Sensitivity analysis
In order to test for the robustness of the statistical results, we undertake four classes of sensitivity analyses: (i) examining the residuals for any observations that exceeded two standard deviations from zero, deleting these observations and re-estimating the model; (ii) estimating a pure cross-section to verify the panel data results are not driven by ''attenuation bias'' 13 ; (iii) utilizing an alternative method to measure political risk following Hermes and Lensink (2001) ; and (iv) including additional control variables from the empirical capital flight literature in the estimation of the equilibrium capital flight equation. To foreshadow our findings in this section, all three types of risk from the theoretical model nearly uniformly continue to be significantly related to capital flight throughout this battery of tests.
Examining the residuals for the three full models in Table 1 (Eqs. (8) and (9), and 10), 33 observations out of 435 had residuals that exceeded two standard deviations from zero. These observations were checked for errors and none were found. Deleting these observations and re-estimating each equation produced insubstantial changes in sign, magnitude, and significance.
Estimating the equilibrium capital flight Eq. (9) for a pure cross-section of the data (averaged over the sample period) reveals that the sign and the magnitude of nearly all of estimated parameters remain stable. All 10 regressions in Table 1 were re-estimated in the cross-section, and are reported in Table C1 in Appendix C. The control variables and inflation risk remain uniformly significant in these regressions, though the variance of the domestic interest rate is insignificant. The socio-political instability and regime change variables nearly all retain their significance, including the ''surprising'' findings that major and minor regime changes reduce capital flight. Policy uncertainty never reaches statistical significance in the four regressions that include it, but then again in only one of the four regressions in Table 1 using panel data is this variable significant.
These results support the estimation from the panel. The risk measures using the variances generally lose significance in the pure cross-section, which is not surprising. Overall, these results indicate robustness in sign, magnitude, and significance.
The third robustness test uses the method of Hermes and Lensink (2001) to measure political risk. This approach first estimates a second-order autoregressive process for each political variable and uses the estimated error term as the risk proxy that enters the capital flight equation. To implement this procedure, we generated the new variables ESPIF1, ESPIF2 (for the two types of SPI), EMJCH, EMRCH, EIRCH (for regime change), and ERPE (for policy uncertainty). Then we re-estimated Eqs. (2)e(9) and (10) as in Table 1 using these variables.
The regression results for the equilibrium capital flight equation using panel data and these new measures of political risk are reported in Table C2 in Appendix C. Relative to the findings reported in Table 1 , all statistically significant variables except two have the same sign, and most estimated coefficients have similar magnitudes. The two variables that are significant in this set of regressions, but carry different signs than in the earlier estimation are policy uncertainty (Eq. (6) in Table C2 ), and irregular regime change (in Eq. (7) in Table C2 ). The former variable is consistently weak in both sets of regressions, and may reflect difficulties with this measure, or that this form of risk is simply not that important for capital flight. Similarly, the estimated coefficients for irregular government change become negative and significant using the residual proxy. This suggests a lack of robustness for the capital flight reversal effect of this variable.
Lastly, we investigate the stability of the regression results to the inclusion of additional economic control variables. Because every theoretical model is an abstraction, this set of tests determines if issues we have ignored in the theory (e.g. bank lending or debt service) are sufficiently important that they nullify our prior empirical results. The additional variables added to the model are those found to be robustly related to capital flight in the extreme bounds analysis performed by Lensink et al. (2000) . The nine additional variables are: foreign aid, AID; bank and trade-related lending, BANK; foreign direct investment, FDI; money and quasi money growth, MONEY; tax revenue, TAX; total debt service, DEBT; general government consumption, GOVCON; private consumption, PRIVCON; and domestic credit provided by banking sector, CREDIT. Data for these variables are taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.
To conserve space, Table C3 in Appendix C reports the results of the additional variables added to the basic economic model and then for the three full politicaleeconomic models from Table 1 (Eqs. (8), (9) and (10)). In all the regressions, the estimated parameters for the measures of economic risk, instability, regime change, and policy risk carry the same signs and significance, and in most cases similar magnitudes as in Table 1 . The lone exception is irregular regime change (IRCH) which, as discussed above, appears to be fairly fragile vis-à-vis capital flight. Many of the added variables are statistically significant in some of the regressions, though none of the additional controls is significant in all four of the regressions in Table  C3 .
The four sets of sensitivity tests taken as a whole demonstrate substantial support for the theory: the factors entering the equilibrium politicaleeconomic capital flight model maintain their signs and significance in nearly all variants examined. This set of tests provide increased confidence for our primary finding that there are a set of political factors that induce capital flight while others generate capital flight reversals.
Related literature on politics and capital flight
We compare our results to three recent empirical papers on capital flight e Lensink et al. (2000) , Hermes and Lensink (2001) , and Collier et al. (2001) e that are related to the model here. Lensink et al. (2000) utilize a large cross-sectional data set with 79e89 countries covering 1971e1991. They examine the impact of six political variables (instability (assassinations plus revolutions), political rights, civil liberties, a war dummy variable, democracy, and institutional structure) on three different measures of capital flight. Also included is a large set of economic variables.
14 Using extreme bounds analyses they identify a subset of economic variables are robust. All political variables they examine are positively related to capital flight. While they use some of the same economic controls as we do, their political variables are measured in levels, rather than capturing risk. Hermes and Lensink (2001) examine the effect of policy uncertainty on capital flight. They measure policy uncertainty by the residual of an AR(2) process for budget deficits, tax payments, government consumption, inflation, and real interest rate. Their results show that policy uncertainty is statistically related to the Morgan Guaranty measure of capital flight when a set of economic control variables and political variables (political instability and civil liberties) are included. This paper is closely related to the model here, both in the focus on politically determined variables and in the set of economic controls utilized. Collier et al. (2001) scrutinized capital flight in 43 developing countries using crosssectional data averaged over 1980e1989. They show that corruption, measured by the Institutional Investor Risk Guide (ICRG) index is positively related to capital flight, controlling for a set of economic variables. Though this paper is narrower than our model, its findings are quite complementary.
Conclusions
This paper examines the effects of various types of risk e economic, political instability, and policy uncertainty e on capital flight. The theoretical model shows that all three determinants of risk affect capital flight by changing investors' asset allocation decisions. Estimating the equilibrium capital flight equation for a panel of 45 developing countries shows that several types of political risks accelerate capital flight, including unconstitutional government change, internal uprisings, and the variance of policy implementation, consistent with the theory. Surprisingly, collective protests, and major and minor constitutional government changes stimulate capital flight reversals. The bulk of these findings survives a battery of sensitivity analyses, and demonstrates the significant impact that political risk has on capital flight.
Appendix A. Data sample Notes: The dependent variable is CAPITAL FLIGHT. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * Statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. All variables are in logarithms. Notes: The dependent variable is CAPITAL FLIGHT. White heteroskedasticity-constant standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * Statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. All variables are in logarithms.
